Operation Mars

Operation Mars was the codename for the Second Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive Operation (Russian: Вторая Ржевско-Сычёвская наступательная операция) launched by Soviet forces against German forces during World War II. It took place between 25 November and 20 December 1942 around the Rzhev salient in the vicinity of Moscow.

The offensive was a joint operation of the Soviet Western Front and Kalinin Front coordinated by Georgy Zhukov.

The basic plan of the offensive was to eliminate the Rzhev salient by launching multiple, coordinated thrusts from all sides of the salient. After the destruction of the German 9th Army, the forces would regroup and link up with the 5th and 33rd Armies which were to attack along the Moscow-Vyazma highway. This latter part of the operation was codenamed Operation Jupiter.

When resistance around Vyazma was neutralized, the 9th and 10th tank corps and the 3rd Tank Army would then penetrate deeper into the rear of Army Group Centre.

The offensive was one in a series of particularly bloody engagements collectively known as the Battles of Rzhev, which occurred near Rzhev, Sychevka and Vyazma between January 1942 and March 1943. The battles became known as the "Rzhev meat grinder" ("Ржевская мясорубка") for their huge losses, particularly on the Soviet side. For many years it was virtually unknown in the West, and just relegated to a footnote in Soviet military history.

The attack
The offensive was launched in the early hours of 25 November. It got off to a bad start, as fog and snowy weather grounded the planned air support. It also greatly reduced the effect of the massive artillery barrages preceding the main attacks, as it made it impossible for the forward artillery observers to adjust fire and observe the results. The northern thrust made little progress. The eastern attack across the frozen Vazuza river slowly ground forward. The two western thrusts made deeper penetrations, especially around the key town of Belyi. The progress was nowhere near what the Soviets expected, however. The outnumbered German defenders fought stubbornly, clinging to their strongpoints, which were often centered around many of the small villages dotting the area. In some cases the German strongpoints remained manned for a time after the Soviets advanced past them, creating more problems for the Red Army in their rear areas. Despite repeated, persistent Soviet attacks, small-arms fire and pre-planned artillery concentrations cut down the attacking infantry. Tanks were picked off by AT guns, by the few German tanks, or even in close combat by infantry.

The relative lack of initial success now compounded the Soviet problems: the minor penetrations and the resulting small bridgeheads made it difficult to bring forward reinforcements and follow-up forces, especially artillery, so critical for reducing the German strongpoints. The Germans were hard-pressed, however, and for a long time, the outcome of the battle hung in the balance. The offensives around Stalingrad had resulted in the encirclement of the entire German 6th Army, and the few strategic reserves were deployed south. What few local reserves the 9th Army possessed were quickly overwhelmed. General Model had to scrape together additional meager reserves by employing literally every man capable of holding a rifle, and by shifting units from less threatened sectors of the salient. Eventually this shifting of forces coupled with Soviet losses and supply difficulties, allowed the German forces to gain the upper hand. The lines held, and slowly some of the lost ground was retaken. The counterattacks against the Belyi (western) and the Vazuza (eastern) thrusts resulted in several thousand soldiers trapped behind German lines. A few of these would manage to break through to Soviet lines, some after fighting as partisans in the German rear for weeks. Almost all vehicles and heavy weapons had to be left behind. However, the Germans were not able to remove Soviet forces from the Luchesa valley in the northwest of the salient, but this was not of much significance since the Soviets there were also unable to press their attack in the difficult terrain.

Outcome
Operation Mars was a military failure. The Soviets were unable to accomplish any of their objectives.

However, in the aftermath of Operation Mars and setbacks at Stalingrad, the Germans began to rethink their strategy of holding the exposed salients. General Von Kluge recommended that the salients be abandoned, both in order to economize on manpower and to redeploy parts of Army Group Center in more defensible positions.

Hitler resisted. He was reluctant to give up any ground won and saw usefulness in retaining the salients for a future thrust towards Moscow. But in the aftermath of Stalingrad, the need to consolidate the German positions and conserve manpower prevailed. The Germans began a successful staged withdrawal at the beginning of March 1943. By the 23rd of that month, the withdrawal was complete.

Summary
Certain sources, such as General Zhukov, claimed afterward that Mars was a secondary diversion operation executed while the real Soviet Offensive was taking place in the south (Operation Uranus). Historians differ on this point.

American historian David Glantz considers that the offensive was more important in Stavka planning than the near-simultaneous Operation Uranus, and its minimisation into a mere holding attack supporting the Stalingrad operation was a propagandistic whitewash. He claims that the plan was to develop it into a breakout for Army Group Center's deep rear.

In this regard, it is interesting to compare the size of the Soviet forces committed to the two offensives:

Operation Mars: Initial forces 668,000 men and 2,000 tanks, plus 415,000 men and 1,265 tanks earmarked for the follow-up offensive Operation Jupiter (about 150,000 men and several hundred tanks were used to reinforce the unsuccessful Operation Mars).

Operation Uranus (initial Stalingrad offensive): 700,000 men and 1,400 tanks, plus 400,000 men and 1,200 tanks for the second part named Operation Saturn.

The losses (as stated below) also compare quite unfavorably with those suffered during the Stalingrad offensives: 155,000 killed/missing and 331,000 wounded over a period of almost two and a half months.

In the words of author David Glantz: "In the unlikely event that Zhukov was correct and Mars was really a diversion, there has never been one so ambitious, so large, so clumsily executed, or so costly".

British historian Antony Beevor disagrees with Glantz, citing that Zhukov spent less time planning Mars than Uranus, and that the artillery shell allocation was much smaller for Mars than for Uranus.[2]

Casualties

 * Soviet: 100,000 KIA/MIA, 235,000WIA,[3] >1,600 tanks
 * German: 40,000 KIA/MIA

[ Notes

 * 1) ^ Гриф секретности снят: Потери Вооруженных Сил СССР в войнах, боевых действиях и военных конфликтах: Стат. исслед./ Г. Ф. Кривошеев, В. М. Андроников, П. Д. Буриков. — М.: Воениздат, 1993.
 * 2) ^ Beevor, Anthony (2012). The Second World War. London: W&N. ISBN 0297844970.
 * 3) ^ David Glantz: Zhukov's greatest defeat page 308